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MIC's Rs 300 Million Gap: Forged Board Notes Lead to Arrests

Two ex-executives held over Rs 300 million payout beyond board-approved sum.

Falsified board minutes at the Mauritius Investment Corporation have triggered the arrest of two former senior executives, after Louis Rivalland flagged a Rs 300 million discrepancy between what the board authorized and what management actually paid out. The Financial Crimes Commission detained former Chief Executive Officer Jitendra Bissessur and former Company Secretary Diya Sewraz. The underlying transaction: the board approved Rs 2.1 billion for the acquisition of 70 percent of the shares in the Ambre hotel, but executives disbursed 48 million euros, equivalent to Rs 2.4 billion at the time of payment. The overage against the authorized cap sits at roughly Rs 300 million. It is that gap, documented through altered minutes, that put the matter in front of investigators. Rivalland's role was procedural rather than investigative, and that is what makes the case instructive for anyone administering fund governance in Mauritius. He intercepted the falsified minutes, recognized the alteration, and reported the unauthorized transaction immediately. His report became the central piece of evidence behind the arrests. In effect, the board-level review function caught what the transaction-level controls did not: a payout that had already cleared well beyond its mandate before anyone at board level was asked to ratify it. The unresolved questions matter more than the headline figures. Nothing in the public record explains how the arrested executives bypassed internal financial controls to move the excess funds. Commentary circulating on social media has skipped over the specific banking authorizations that would have been required to release the additional sums, and the public record still lacks both the original, legitimate board minutes and the falsified versions Rivalland flagged. The working assumption, that the falsified minutes were the sole mechanism used to breach the authorized limit, has not been confirmed. Alternative pathways, whether through payment sequencing, banking instructions, or documentation presented to counterpart banks, remain unverified. Whatever the precise method, the operational failure is clear. A Rs 2.4 billion payout cleared against a Rs 2.1 billion authorization, a gap of hundreds of millions of rupees, without the internal control environment stopping it at transaction level. For fund administrators and company secretaries, the case is a reminder that minute integrity is not a clerical matter. The board record is the authoritative reference against which disbursements are tested, and if that record can be altered undetected between authorization and payment, the reconciliation between mandate and execution depends entirely on someone reading the documents closely enough to notice. By contrast with the controls that missed the breach, Rivalland's intervention is fiduciary diligence functioning as designed. A board member's review of the underlying documentation caught what the transaction-level checks did not, and the resulting evidence was sufficient for the Financial Crimes Commission to act. The lesson for practitioners is unglamorous but direct: verify the minutes against the resolutions, reconcile the disbursement against the authorization, and escalate the discrepancy before the funds are gone. On the current timeline, the arrests of Bissessur and Sewraz mark the first enforcement step, with the precise mechanics of the control breach still to be established by the Commission.